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
 
 
In the course of the 2012/13 legal year, the Supreme Court has had to 
consider the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil twice, in VTB Capital plc v 
Nutritek International Corpn (VTB),
1
  and more recently in Prest v Petrodel 
Resources Ltd (Prest)
2
 On both occasions, the Court was in effect asked to 
remove the whole doctrine from English Law, but narrowly failed to do so, 
begging the question, does the doctrine really serve any purpose now? Let me 
start with Prest. 
 
1. PREST AND THE LOWER COURTS 
 
The case involved contentious divorce proceedings and ancillary relief. At 
first instance,
3
 Moylan J held that the matrimonial home, legally owned by 
one of the husband‟s companies, was held on trust beneficially for the 
husband and should be transferred to the wife. This was not appealed, but 
Moylan J went on to hold that seven other properties held by other companies 
be likewise transferred to support lump sum and periodical payments. Three 
different arguments were advanced for such a transfer, namely that: 
 
1. the corporate veil should be pierced as a matter of general principle 
and the properties treated as the husband‟s so that they could be 
transferred to the wife under s 24(1)(a) of the Matrimonial Causes Act 
1972; 
 
2. the wording of s 24(1)(a) allowing the transfer property “being 
property to which the first mentioned party is entitled in possession or 
reversion” should be interpreted as giving a special statutory power to 
pierce the veil and effect the transfer; or 
 
                                                     

 Professor Alistair Alcock, Dean of Law and Deputy Vice-Chancellor, University of 
Buckingham. 
1
 [2013] 2 WLR 398, SC(E). 
2
 [2013] 3 WLR 1, SC(E). 
3
 Sub nom Prest v Prest [2011] EWHC 2956 (Fam). 
CASE COMMENTARY 
242 
3. the properties (like the matrimonial home) were held beneficially by 
the companies on trust for the husband and s 24(1)(a) could be used 
without piercing the veil. 
 
Moylan J rejected 1., holding that generally the separate legal personality 
of the company could not be disregarded unless it was being abused for a 
purpose that was in some relevant respect improper. He also found under 3., 
that the houses were not held beneficially for the husband, in part because he 
found under 2., that despite its wording, s 24(1)(a) did give a wide statutory 
jurisdiction to pierce the corporate veil. 
In the Court of Appeal,
4
 Thorpe LJ agreed with Moylan J, but the majority 
judgment given by Rimer LJ, rejected not just this curious interpretation of s 
24(1)(a), but also any piercing of the corporate veil and recognition of any 
beneficial ownership by the husband, leaving the wife without the seven 
properties to support the lump sum and periodical payments order. 
 
2. PREST AND THE SUPREME COURT 
 
In a Supreme Court of seven justices, all rejected Moylan J‟s curious 
interpretation of s 24(1)(a) and any piercing of the corporate veil, but did find, 
on the specific facts taken with a set of adverse inferences based on the 
husband‟s obstructive behaviour, that the seven properties were held 
beneficially on trust for the husband. The interesting use of adverse inferences 
has been considered elsewhere.
5
 This article concentrates on where Prest has 
left the general doctrine of piercing the corporate veil. 
At all three levels, all the judges rejected any such doctrine applying to the 
facts in Prest, for as Lord Sumption JSC concluded:
6
 
 
“[The properties] were vested in the companies long before the 
marriage broke up. Whatever the husband‟s reasons for organising 
things in that way, there is no evidence that he was seeking to avoid 
any obligation which is relevant in these proceedings. The judge 
found that his purpose was „wealth protection and the avoidance of 
tax.”‟7 
 
Lord Sumption gave the leading judgment of the Court, but on the 
doctrine of piercing the corporate veil, care must be taken; not only because as 
Lord Walker of Gestingthorpe  pointed out, having decided that the properties 
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were held beneficially by the husband, it was “not strictly necessary for this 
court to add further comments on the vexed question of piercing the corporate 
veil;”8 but also because as Lord Clarke of Stone-cum-Ebony JSC commented, 
the concealment-evasion distinction at the heart of Lord Sumption‟s judgment 
“was not a distinction that was discussed in the course of argument.”9 Indeed, 
none of the other six Justices of the Supreme Court agreed with Lord 
Sumption without some qualifications, falling perhaps into two groups, Lords 
Mance and Clarke JJSC following Lord Neuberger PSC, and Lord Wilson 
JSC and to a lesser extent Lord Walker following Baroness Hale JSC. 
First, Lord Sumption excluded, as not relevant to determine the English 
doctrine of piercing the veil, all the cases where:
10
 
 
1. it could be said that the corporate veil was being circumvented by a 
normal legal principle, for example: 
 
The controller may be personally liable, generally in addition to 
the company, for something that he has done as its agent or as a 
joint actor.
11
 Property legally vested in a company may belong 
beneficially to the controller...
12
 
 
2. specific statutes required group companies to be treated as one, eg 
Group accounts and “firms” for the purposes of competition law; 
 
3. equitable remedies, like injunctions or specific performance, were 
“available to compel the controller whose legal personality is engaged 
to exercise his control in a particular way”; and 
 
4. Re Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co Ltd13 was followed, it 
being a decision of the International Court of Justice based on the 
domestic civil law jurisdictions involved which, unlike the common 
law in England, allowed the corporate veil to be pierced for abuse of 
rights. 
 
Nevertheless, on this last point, Lord Sumption did recognise that English 
law does have the general principle encapsulated by Lord Denning (then 
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Denning LJ) as “fraud unravels everything.”14 Lord Sumption maintained 
“that there are limited circumstances in which the law treats the use of a 
company as a means of evading the law as dishonest for this purpose.”15 
 
3. THE PRECEDENTS 
 
In a review of the precedents, Lord Sumption noted that following the 
House of Lords‟ (albeit Scottish) decision in Woolfson v Strathclyde Regional 
Council
16
 and the Court of Appeal decision in Adams v Cape Industries plc,
17
 
Sir Andrew Morritt V-C in Trustor AB v Smallbone (No 2)
18
 had concluded 
that there were only two overlapping circumstances when the corporate veil 
could be pierced. They were where the company was: 
 
1. a “façade or sham”; or 
 
2. involved in some impropriety “linked to the use of the company 
structure to avoid or conceal liability for that impropriety.”19 
 
What was certainly determined in all three cases was that “the court is not 
free to disregard the principle of Salomon v A Salomon & Co Ltd
20
 merely 
because it considers that justice requires it.”21 Nevertheless, in their efforts to 
ensure effective ancillary relief, this was exactly what some judges of the 
Family Division continued to do.
22
 These judges relied on the words, albeit 
obiter, of Cummings-Bruce and Dillon LJJ in Nicholas v Nicholas,
23
 where 
they suggested that the only reason that they had not pierced the corporate veil 
to allow company property to be transferred for ancillary relief was because 
the company, although controlled by the husband, had independent minority 
shareholders who would be adversely affected. 
At least one Chancery Division judge, Munby J, in cases like A v A
24
 and 
Ben Hashem v Al Shayif,
25
 rejected the approach of the Family Division. In 
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the latter case, he merged the two circumstances accepted by Sir Andrew 
Morritt V-C into one when he formulated six principles behind piercing the 
corporate veil,
26
 namely: 
 
1. ownership and control of a company were not of themselves enough 
to justify piercing; 
 
2. nor was merely being in the interests of justice to do it, even where 
third party interests were not affected; 
 
3. there must have been some impropriety; 
 
4. that impropriety must have been “linked to the use of the company 
structure to avoid or conceal liability;”27 
 
5. there must have been both control by the wrongdoers and 
impropriety, ie misuse by them as a device or façade to conceal their 
wrongdoing; but 
 
6. the company may be a façade, even if not originally incorporated with 
deception in mind, provided it was used for deception at the time of 
the relevant transactions. 
 
This narrow approach was adopted by the Court of Appeal in VTB with 
two further qualifications: 
 
1. it was not necessary before piercing the corporate veil to show that 
there was no other remedy available; but 
 
2. it was necessary to show that “the relevant wrongdoing must be in the 
nature of an independent wrong that involves the fraudulent or 
dishonest misuse of the corporate personality of the company for the 
purpose of concealing the true facts.” 28 
4. VTB AND THE SUPREME COURT 
 
The Supreme Court upheld the Court of Appeal‟s decision in VTB29 but, in 
delivering its judgment, Lord Neuberger was not prepared in an interlocutory 
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action to go the one step further, proposed by Counsel for one of the 
defendant companies, and kill off the whole idea of there being a separate 
doctrine of piercing the corporate veil. Lord Neuberger summarised this 
argument as follows:
30
 
 
“Mr Lazarus argued that in all, or at least almost all, the cases where 
the principle was actually applied, it was either common ground that 
the principle existed…31 and/or the result achieved by piercing the veil 
of incorporation could have been achieved by a less controversial 
route – for instance, through the law of agency…32 through statutory 
interpretation…33 or on the basis that… money due to an individual 
which he directs to his company is treated as received by him.”34 
 
One senses that Lord Neuberger was nearly convinced,
35
 but because he 
was clear that the contractual liability of a company could not be extended to 
a controlling shareholder as proposed in VTB, on the more general doctrine he 
concluded that:
 36
 
 
“...  it is unnecessary and inappropriate to resolve the issue of whether 
we should decide that, unless any statute relied on in a particular case 
expressly or impliedly provides otherwise, the court cannot pierce the 
veil of incorporation.” 
 
Having ducked the issue once, he did tackle it in Prest, but before 
examining his views, it is necessary to return to Lord Sumption‟s judgment on 
which Lord Neuberger‟s is built.   
 
5. LORD SUMPTION’S VIEWS 
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Having reviewed the precedents discussed above, Lord Sumption 
concluded in Prest that:
37
 
 
“… the consensus that there are circumstances in which the court may 
pierce the corporate veil is impressive… I think that the recognition of 
a limited power to pierce the corporate veil in carefully defined 
circumstances is necessary if the law is not to be disarmed in the face 
of abuse.” 
 
The carefully defined circumstances, according to Lord Sumption, turned 
on the distinction between: 
 
1. the concealment principle “…the interposition if a company or… 
companies so as to conceal the identity of the real actors,” and 
  
2. the evasion principle “…if there is a legal right against the person in 
control… and the company is interposed… [to] defeat the right or 
frustrate its enforcement.”38  
 
Only evasion requires piercing of the corporate veil. Lord Sumption then 
illustrated this distinction with two cases, Gilford Motor Co Ltd v Horne 
(Gilford)
39
 and Jones v Lipman (Jones).
40
 
In Gilford Mr Horne had entered into a restrictive covenant not to conduct 
a competing business, but then set up a company under his wife‟s apparent 
control to conduct such a business. The Court of Appeal granted an injunction 
against Mr Horne and against the new company. Lord Sumption held that the 
injunction against Mr Horne was on the concealment principle, but that 
against the company was true piercing of the veil under the evasion principle, 
though he conceded that the injunction against the company could have been:
 
41
 
“… on the ground that Mr Horne‟s knowledge was to be imputed to 
the company so as to make the latter‟s conduct unconscionable or 
tortious… [Also] it does not follow that [the company] was to be 
identified with Mr Horne for any other purpose. Mr Horne‟s personal 
creditors would not, for example, have been entitled… to enforce their 
claims against the assets of the company.” 
 
                                                     
37
 [2013] 3 WLR 1, SC(E) at para 27. 
38
 Ibid at para28. 
39
 [1933] Ch 935, CA. 
40
 [1962] 1 WLR 832. 
41
 [2013] 3 WLR 1, SC(E) at para 29. 
CASE COMMENTARY 
248 
Likewise, in Jones, Mr Lipman had entered into a sale of a property, but 
to defeat an order of specific performance, then sold the property to a 
company controlled by himself. Specific performance was ordered against Mr 
Lipman (the concealment principle) and the company (the evasion principle), 
the latter leaving a bank the creditor of the company for half the purchase 
price of the property but with the company now without the property.
42
 
So far, it might be thought that Lord Sumption‟s distinction was no more 
than whether the action was being brought against the controller 
(concealment) or the company (evasion). But in two further cases, Lord 
Sumption made it clear that actions against the companies fell within 
concealment, not evasion. 
In Gencor ACP Ltd v Dalby
43
 Mr Dalby, a director of the plaintiff, had 
directed payments from a third party to be paid to a company controlled by 
himself. Rimer J, in ordering the company to be accountable for the sums to 
the plaintiff, as well as Mr Dalby, claimed to be piercing the corporate veil, 
but Lord Sumption maintained that this was not the case as the company was 
clearly just a nominee of Mr Dalby and as such independently liable to 
account for the moneys and so the case only involved concealment.
44
 
In Trustor AB v Smallbone (No 2)
45
 again a company had been set up to 
receive illegitimate moneys on behalf of Mr Smallbone as his agent or 
nominee and was directly liable as such and so again nLord Sumption 
considered that this was only concealment.
46
 
Lord Sumption concluded that:
 47
 
 
“... there is a limited principle of English law which applies when a 
person is under an existing legal obligation or liability or subject to an 
existing legal restriction which he deliberately evades or whose 
enforcement he deliberately frustrates by interposing a company under 
his control… The principle is properly described as a limited one, 
because in almost every case where the test is satisfied, the facts will 
in practice disclose a legal relationship between the company and its 
controller which will make it unnecessary to pierce the corporate 
veil… I consider that if it is not necessary to pierce the corporate veil, 
it is not appropriate to do so.” 
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6. LORD NEUBERGER’S VIEWS 
 
Lord Neuberger reduced Lord Sumption‟s review of the history of 
piercing the corporate veil to six findings:
48
 
 
1. The International Court of Justice recognised the doctrine but only in 
the context of civil law systems.
49
 
 
2. There were judgments based on the doctrine in family cases, but its 
application in these cases was unsound.
 50 
 
3. There were two cases outside the family law context, Gilford and 
Jones which laid the ground for the doctrine.
51
 
 
4. There were two subsequent cases in which it was assumed the 
doctrine existed, but they were merely obiter observations.
52
 
 
5. The Court of Appeal and High Court had subsequently assumed the 
doctrine does exist.
53
 
 
6. In only two of those cases had the doctrine been relied on, and that 
was illegitimate as they could have been decided without recourse to 
the doctrine.
54
  
 
Although Lord Sumption left Gilford and Jones as cases of evasion 
relying on the doctrine, Lord Neuberger determined that the injunction against 
the company in Gilford could easily have been justified on the basis that the 
company was Horne‟s agent or nominee (as indeed any natural person, like 
Horne‟s wife, could have been). Indeed, Lord Neuberger pointed out that no 
member of the Court of Appeal in Gilford “thought that he was making new 
                                                     
48
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law, let alone cutting into the well established and simple principle laid down 
in Salomon.”55 
As for Jones, Lord Neuberger thought the injunction against the company 
unnecessary:
 56
 
 
“An order for specific performance would have required Lipman not 
merely to convey the property in question to the plaintiffs, but to do 
everything which was reasonably in his power to ensure that the 
property was so conveyed… Lipman could have compelled the 
company to convey the property to the plaintiffs (on the basis that he 
would have to account to the company for the purchase price, which 
would have ensured that the bank was in no way prejudiced).” 
 
Not only is this a more elegant solution than Lord Sumption‟s, avoiding as 
it does the problem of the third party rights of the bank, it should have been 
Lord Sumption‟s, since he had already highlighted early in his judgment, that 
“equitable remedies, such as an injunction or specific performance, may be 
available to compel the controller whose personal legal responsibility is 
engaged to exercise his control in a particular way.”57 
As Lord Neuberger agreed with Lord Sumption
58
 that the courts could 
only pierce the corporate veil “when all other, more conventional, remedies 
have been proved to be of no assistance,”59 he was forced to conclude that: 
 
The history of the doctrine… is… a series of decisions, each of which 
can be put into one of three categories, namely:
 60
 
 
1. decisions in which it was assumed that the doctrine existed, 
but it was rightly concluded that it did not apply on the facts; 
 
2. decisions in which it was assumed that the doctrine existed, 
and it was wrongly concluded that it applied on the facts; and 
 
3. decisions in which it was assumed that the doctrine existed 
and it was applied to the facts, but where the result could have 
been arrived at on some other, conventional, legal basis, and 
therefore it was wrongly concluded that it applied. 
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 Ibid at para 72. 
57
 Ibid at para 16. 
58
 Contrary to the Court of Appeal in VTB [2013] 2 WLR 557, CA at para 79. 
59
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Having established that there had been no cases in the UK that needed to 
rely on the doctrine, and after reviewing the chaotic judicial and academic 
views on the doctrine across the common law world,
61
 one would have 
expected Lord Neuberger finally to have decided that the doctrine was at least 
otiose if not dead. Instead he concluded that:
62
 
 
“...it would be wrong to discard a doctrine which, while it has been 
criticised by judges and academics, has been generally assumed to 
exist in all common law jurisdictions… I am persuaded by [Lord 
Sumption‟s] formulation in para 35, namely that the doctrine should 
only be invoked where „a person is under an existing legal obligation 
or liability or subject to an existing legal restriction which he 
deliberately evades or whose enforcement he deliberately frustrates by 
interposing a company under his control.”‟ 
 
Nevertheless, Lord Neuberger seems to have remained conscious of the 
illogicality of this position, and went on really to deny the separate existence 
of the doctrine:
 63
 
 
“In so far as it is based on “fraud unravels everything”… the 
formulation simply involves the invocation of a well-established 
principle… [It] is not, on analysis, a statement about piercing the 
corporate veil at all. Thus it would presumably apply equally to a 
person who transfers assets to a spouse or civil partner, rather than to a 
company. Further… it could probably be analysed as being based on 
agency or trusteeship especially in the light of the words “under his 
control”. However, if either or both those points were correct, it would 
not undermine Lord Sumption JSC‟s characterisation of the doctrine: 
it would, if anything, serve to confirm the existence of the doctrine, 
albeit, as an aspect of a more conventional principle.”  
7. BARONESS HALE’S VIEWS 
 
Of the judgments on the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil, the most 
curious is Lady Hale‟s. She draws the distinction between where a remedy is 
being sought against a controlling shareholder and where it is being sought 
against the company.
64
 However, she then applies the doctrine the wrong way 
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around. In Gilford and in Jones, there was no doubt that the controlling 
shareholders had broken their contracts, and in Stone & Rolls v Moore 
Stephens (Stone & Rolls)
65
 had the fraudulent controlling shareholder been 
bringing a claim against the auditors, he would clearly have faced the defence 
of ex turpi causa. The problems arose because the remedy was being sought 
(or defence raised) against the company. Lady Hale may be right to say:
 66
 
 
“… where it is sought to convert the personal liability of the owner or 
controller into a liability of the company, it is usually more 
appropriate to rely on the concepts of agency and of the „directing 
mind‟.” 
 
However, if the doctrine does not have a place in the rules of attribution, it 
really has no place at all and like her fellow judges, Lady Hale was not 
prepared to go that far, doubting indeed that: 
 
“… it is possible to classify all the cases in which the courts have been 
or should be prepared to disregard the separate personality of a 
company neatly into cases of either concealment or evasion.”67 
 
8. LORD WALKER’S VIEWS 
 
After pointing out that all commentary on the doctrine of piercing the 
corporate veil in Prest was obiter, Lord Walker came the closest to denying 
the existence of the doctrine altogether. He considered all the cases, with the 
possible exception of the House of Lords decision in Stone & Rolls,
68
 could be 
explained by the application of other legal principles.
69
 
 
9. CONCLUSION 
 
In the end, all seven Justice of the Supreme Court held that: 
 
1. the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil was not necessary to decide 
the case and could not be applied on the facts; 
 
2. nevertheless, the doctrine still existed (Lord Walker most doubtfully); 
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66
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3. but it might just be a particular application in the corporate context of 
a more general principle that “fraud unravels everything” or of other 
legal principles;
70
 and 
 
4. that it should only apply if no other basis for a remedy existed. 
 
All seven judges struggled to find examples where the doctrine had 
actually been necessary. Lords Sumption and Neuberger did agree on the 
formulation that the doctrine should only be invoked where:
 71
 
 
“A person is under an existing legal obligation or liability or subject to 
an existing legal restriction which he deliberately evades or whose 
enforcement he deliberately frustrates by interposing a company under 
his control.” 
 
This formulation does seem to have been accepted by all but Lord Walker, 
although Lords Mance and Clarke were reluctant completely to close off the 
possibility of other circumstances in which the doctrine might be used.
72
 Pace 
Lady Hale, the formulation, particularly if based on the evasion/concealment 
distinction, seems only to apply to actions, or defences raised, against the 
company, ie is part of the rules of attribution,
73
 and herein may lie the answer 
to the lingering death of the doctrine. 
Just as the rule in Turquand
74
 developed against the background of the 
ultra vires rule, constructive notice, and a far from developed application of 
agency rules in the corporate context, so the doctrine of piercing the corporate 
veil was born against a background of restrictive rules of attribution. Now that 
other legal principles have developed, should both of these two be killed off 
like the dodo? Certainly in the case of piercing the corporate veil Lord Walker 
seemed to think so. As he pointed out, all the past cases might be explained 
by:
 75
 
 
“… a statutory provision, or from joint liability in tort, or from the law 
of unjust enrichment, or from principles of equity and the law of 
                                                     
70
 Lady Hale put it rather more vaguely as “companies should not be allowed to take 
unconscionable advantage of the people with whom they do business.” [2013] 3 WLR 
1, SC(E).  
71
 Ibid at paras 35 and 81. 
72
 [2013] 3 WLR 1, SC(E), at paras 100 and 103. 
73
 As explained by Lord Hoffman in Meridian Global Funds Management Asia Ltd v 
Securities Commission [1995] 2 BCLC 116, PC. 
74
 Royal British Bank v Turquand (1856) 6 E&B 327. 
75
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trusts… [or] from the potency of an injunction or other court order in 
binding third parties who are aware of its terms.”   
 
Even the one possible exception that Lord Walker considered might need 
the doctrine, Stone & Rolls, is interesting. If anything, the majority of the 
House of Lords in that case came to a very restrictive view of when the 
wrongs of a controlling shareholder might be attributed to the company to 
raise the defence of ex turpi causa against the company. They were only 
prepared to allow such attribution in the case of “one man” companies with no 
innocent minority shareholders affected. This was the same concern raised in 
the now discredited obiter dicta of Cummings-Bruce and Dillon LJJ in 
Nicholas v Nicholas.
76
 Does this mean that if the doctrine of piercing the 
corporate veil is to survive, far from it being to cover “a small residual 
category” of cases,77 as suggested by the Supreme Court in Prest, it should be 
to act as a restraint on the application of all the other legal principles that 
might give rise to the attribution to a company of the faults of its controlling 
shareholder, at least if those principles adversely affect minority shareholders 
and even creditors as suggested by the House of Lords in Stone & Rolls? 
                                                     
76
 [1984] FLR 285, CA at pp 287 and 292. 
77
 [2013] 3 WLR 1, SC(E), per Lord Walker at para 106. 
